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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON 
and JOAN ELISSA McPHERSON, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
VAUGHN BELNAP and 
JEFFREY BELNAP 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 910108 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
VAUGHN BELNAP 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), 
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
For purposes of clarity, and to avoid confusion, defendant-
appellant Vaughn Belnap will be referred to as "Vaughn". Codefendant 
Jeffrey Belnap will be identified as "Jeffrey". Plaintiffs-appellees Joseph 
and Joan McPherson will be referred to as "McPherson". 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Vaughn 
entered into a contract of bailment with McPherson, that Vaughn and 
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McPherson stood in the relationship of bailee and bailor and that 
McPherson's personal property was delivered to Vaughn rather than 
Jeffrey. 
2. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a bailment was 
created, whether the trial court erred in concluding that it was a bail-
ment for mutual benefit, as opposed to a gratuitous bailment and that, 
consequently, a standard of simple negligence, as opposed to gross 
negligence, was applicable. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in imposing a presumption of 
negligence on Vaughn. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Vaughn was 
negligent and that his negligence proximately caused McPherson's in-
juries. 
5. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Vaughn did 
not rebut the presumption, if any, that he was negligent and that his 
negligence caused the loss of McPherson's personal property. 
These combined issues of law and fact each require the review 
of a finding of fact. The standard of appellate review requires that 
Vaughn marshall the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
and demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, 
thus making them clearly erroneous. (Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). 
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STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules 
or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the issues on 
appeal in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
McPherson brought suit in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County against Vaughn and Jeffrey to recover damages 
allegedly arising from the conversion of certain items of personal 
property or, in the alternative, arising from a breach of a contract of 
bailment. (Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 2-6). 
Vaughn was served with a Summons and a copy of the Complaint. 
(R. 8-10). Jeffrey was not served with a Summons and the case 
proceeded solely against Vaughn. 
Vaughn filed his Answer on June 13, 1989 (R. 11-15) and his 
Amended Answer on May 30, 1990. (R. 42-47). 
The case was tried to the Court, without a jury, the Honorable 
John A. Rokich, presiding, on August 30, 1990. 
After hearing testimony and the arguments and representations of 
counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement. (R. 84). 
On September 14, 1990, the Court rendered its Memorandum 
Decision in which it found that McPherson entered into a contract of 
bailment with Vaughn, pursuant to which Vaughn stored certain items 
of personal property belonging to McPherson, the personal property was 
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stolen, a presumption arose to the effect that Vaughn was negligent, 
Vaughn "failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not as a 
result of his negligence" and McPherson was damaged in the amount 
of $6,000. (R. 99-102). 
McPherson submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. Vaughn filed his Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. (R. 141-144). 
Vaughn then filed a Motion for New Trial and/or to Direct Entry 
of Judgment in Favor of Defendant. (R. 150-151). 
On January 2, 1991, the Court rendered its Memorandum Decision 
denying the Motion for New Trial. On January 24, 1991, the Court 
entered its Order denying the Motion for New Trial and the Objections 
to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 199-200). 
On January 24, 1991, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 201-206). Judgment was entered on January 
28, 1991. (R. 207-209). 
Vaughn's Notice of Appeal was filed on February 25, 1991. (R. 
210-211). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Vaughn leased a condominium unit to McPherson during the 
month of September, 1988. (Trial Transcript, p. 37, Ins. 4-7). 
In late November, 1988, Vaughn requested that McPherson 
voluntarily vacate the condominium unit because Jeffrey had offered to 
buy the unit from Vaughn and because Jeffrey was "going through a 
4 
divorce" and it would be convenient for him to move into the con-
dominium. (Trial Transcript, p. 38, Ins. 6-17; p. 7, Ins. 24-25; p. 8 Ins. 
1-11). 
McPherson agreed to vacate the condominium unit. (Trial Trans-
cript, p. 8, Ins. 12-25; p. 9, Ins. 1-8; p. 38, Ins. 21-25; p. 39, Ins. 1-9). 
McPherson found alternative lodging in a furnished apartment and 
informed Vaughn that he had no room to store his furniture. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 9, Ins. 22-25; p. 10, Ins. 1-4). 
Vaughn told McPherson that Jeffrey had no furniture because he 
was in the process of obtaining a divorce (Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins. 
12-16) and that he would speak with Jeffrey concerning McPherson's 
proposal to leave the furniture in the condominium unit. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 62, Ins. 8-22). 
Jeffrey agreed to keep the furniture in the condominium unit 
which he would occupy. (Trial Transcript, p. 63, Ins. 5-6). 
Vaughn then informed McPherson that Jeffrey had agreed to let 
him leave some of the furniture in the condominium unit (Trial Tran-
script, p. 63, Ins. 9-11). 
McPherson advised Vaughn of his concerns about the safety of his 
property while it was in the condominium unit. Vaughn stated that it 
would probably be fine. (Trial Transcript, p. 73, Ins. 10-16). 
After McPherson vacated the condominium unit, Jeffrey immediate-
ly occupied the condominium unit as a tenant, paying rent to Vaughn 
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in the same amount as was paid by McPherson. (Trial Transcript, p. 
64, Ins. 5-17). 
Vaughn did not, at any time, have the possession, or use, of 
McPherson's furniture. (Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 18-23). 
McPherson acknowledged that the furniture was left in the con-
dominium for Jeffrey's use. (Trial Transcript, p. 35, Ins. 12-18). 
The furniture and other items of personal property owned by 
McPherson and left in the condominium unit rented by Jeffrey were 
stolen on December 15, 1988. (Trial Transcript, p. 46, Ins. 2-5; p. 47, 
Ins. 1-3; p. 49, Ins. 10-17). 
On December 15, 1988, a neighbor saw a pickup truck occupied 
by two men loaded with furniture parked in front of the condominium 
unit occupied by Jeffrey. Neither Vaughn nor Jeffrey were occupants 
of the truck. (Trial Transcript, p. 55, Ins. 11-25; p. 56, Ins. 1-4). 
The police officer investigating the crime found no evidence of 
forcible entry. The theft was reported at 11:30 p.m. (Trial Transcr-
ipt, p. 47, Ins. 15-17). 
Vaughn lived in the condominium unit prior to the time it was 
occupied by McPherson. At the time Vaughn lived in the unit the 
doors were equipped with dead bolt locks and normal security was 
provided. There was no difference in the security of the condominium 
unit at the time it was occupied by Vaughn and the time of the theft. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 21-25; p. 69, Ins. 1-8). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. An essential element of the existence of a bailment, and 
therefore the creation of the relationship of bailor and bailee, is that 
the bailee have actual possession and control of the bailed property. 
Although the trial court found that McPherson's property was placed in 
the possession and control of Vaughn, there is no evidence to support 
this finding. In fact, the undisputed evidence is that McPherson's 
furniture was stored in the condominium unit rented and occupied by 
Jeffrey, that Jeffrey had the use of the furniture and that McPherson 
intended that Jeffrey have the use of the furniture. Thus, an essential 
element of a bailee-bailor relationship is absent and the erred in 
finding that such a relationship existed between Vaughn and McPherson 
In addition, the only evidence with respect to the existence of an 
agreement between Vaughn and McPherson concerning the storage of 
the furniture is that Vaughn acted as an intermediary between 
McPherson and Jeffrey, rather than as a party to the agreement. Thus, 
the finding of the trial court is against the clear weight of the evi-
dence. 
2. The Court erred in finding that a bailment for mutual benefit, 
as opposed to a gratuitous bailment, was created and consequently it 
erroneously applied a standard of ordinary care, rather than gross 
negligence. In the context of a bailment for mutual benefit, the bailee 
must exercise ordinary care. A gratuitous bailee is liable only for acts 
of gross negligence. Although McPherson argued that Vaughn used the 
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furniture to further the sale of the condominium, the only evidence 
before the Court established that Jeffrey offered to purchase the 
condominium prior to any negotiations concerning furniture storage. As 
Jeffrey, not Vaughn, had the use and benefit of the furniture, Vaughn 
did not receive a benefit from the alleged bailment. Therefore, the 
bailment, if any, was gratuitous and Vaughn may be held liable only for 
acts of gross negligence. 
3. McPherson did not present any evidence, or even identify, any 
acts of specific negligence on the part of Vaughn. In essence, 
McPherson prevailed at the trial court because the court imposed a 
presumption of negligence. A presumption of negligence in the context 
of a bailment may be imposed only where the bailee has exclusive 
possession of the bailed goods and exclusive control of the premises in 
which the goods are stored. There is no evidence that Vaughn had 
either exclusive possession of the bailed goods or exclusive control of 
the condominium unit in which McPherson's furniture was stored. In 
fact, the undisputed evidence establishes that Vaughn did not have 
exclusive possession of McPherson's furniture or exclusive control of the 
condominium unit. Therefore, the Court erred in imposing a pre-
sumption of negligence. As no evidence of specific acts of negligence 
or causation was presented, the trial court's decision should be reversed. 
4. Assuming the trial court incorrectly imposed a presumption of 
negligence, the record is devoid of any evidence of any specific acts of 
negligence, ordinary or gross, on the part of Vaughn. Thus, absent a 
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presumption of negligence, the decision of the trial court must be 
reversed. 
5. Vaughn successfully rebutted the presumption of negligence. 
Once a presumption of negligence arises, the burden of going forward 
with the evidence, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the 
bailee. The only evidence which was presented concerning Vaughn's 
care of the bailed goods is that he exercised the same care with 
respect to the bailed goods as he did with respect to his own property. 
That is, the condominium unit was secured with deadbolt locks. In 
addition, Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled securing the unit 
on the day of the theft. As McPherson relied solely on the presump-
tion of negligence and that presumption was rebutted, the trial court 
erred in awarding Judgment to McPherson. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
VAUGHN DID NOT ENTER INTO A CONTRACT 
OF BAILMENT WITH MCPHERSON 
A. 
Elements of Bailment 
The trial court found that Vaughn and McPherson entered into a 
contract of bailment, that they therefore stood in the relationship of 
bailee and bailor and that McPherson's personal property was delivered 
to Vaughn, rather than Jeffrey. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, (R. 203, 11 7; 204, 11 1) (see Addendum). 
As stated at 8 Am. Jur. 2d BAILMENTS § 2, 
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A "bailment" in its ordinary legal signification, 
imports the delivery of personal property by 
one person to another in trust for a specific 
purpose, with a contract, express or implied, 
that the trust shall be faithfully executed and 
the property returned or duly accounted for 
when the special purpose is accomplished or 
kept until the bailor reclaims it. (id. at 738) 
Inherent in this definition is the requirement that the bailee have 
actual possession and control of the subject of the bailment. In Marsh 
vs. American Locker Co., 1 N.J. Super. 81, 72 A.2d 343 (1950), the 
Court stated this proposition as follows: 
Although conflicting views have been ex-
pressed by the authorities as to whether 
common law bailments necessarily arise out of 
contract, they all recognize the need that 
there be possession of the property by the 
bailee. See 4 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 
1936) pp. 2888, 2890; Brown, Personal Property 
(1936) pp. 225, 230. (72 A.2d at 344) 
Similarly, in 1440 Park Road Parking, Inc. vs. Consolidated Mutual 
Insurance Company, 168 A.2d 900 (D.C. Mun. App. 1961), the Court 
noted that: M[t]he creation of a bailment requires that possession and 
control over an object pass from the bailor to the bailee". (168 A.2d 
at 901) (emphasis added). 
The Court, in Broaddus vs. Commercial National Bank, 113 Okla. 
10, 237 P. 538 (1925), held that to constitute a bailment there must be 
a delivery and full transfer of the property to the bailee, so as to 
exclude the possession of the owner and all other persons and give to 
the bailee, for the time being, the sole custody and control of the 
property. (237 P. at 584). 
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More recently the Oregon Court of Appeals, in Dundas vs. Lincoln 
County, 48 Or. App. 1025, 618 P.2d 978 (1980), stated that "[i]n order 
for a bailment to exist, the bailee must have both possession and 
physical control . . .". (618 P.2d at 982). 
Thus, in order for Vaughn and McPherson to stand in the 
relationship of bailee and bailor, the evidence must establish (a) the 
delivery of personal property to Vaughn; (b) a contract, express or 
implied, that Vaughn would hold the personal property in trust for 
McPherson; (c) actual possession and physical control of the bailed 
property by Vaughn; and (d) an agreement that the bailed property 
would be safely returned to McPherson. 
B. 
Evidence Supporting 
Trial Court's Finding 
The evidence which supports the finding of the trial court as to 
the existence of a bailment is as follows: 
1. McPherson testified, on direct examination, as follows: 
A: . . . we had found a place but it was 
furnished and now we had to do some-
thing with our furniture. And he 
[Vaughn] indicated at that time that his 
- it was his son and - it would be his 
son moving in and he was just getting 
divorced and he had no furniture. And 
so it was - you know, he said, well, he 
[Jeffrey] wouldn't mind if that was left 
there, he would take good care of it. . 
. . But it was Vaughn who was the 
person I was dealing with because it was 
Vaughn who had bought our house. 
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Mr. Reed: Objection, your Honor. The 
answer at this point is not responsive. 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins. 10-25). 
2. McPherson also testified that his understanding of the 
agreement concerning the furniture was that " . . . the furniture was 
just to be left there long enough until we could find a permanent place 
to live". (Trial Transcript, p. 11, Ins. 15-17). 
3. As to the basis for McPherson's belief that his agreement was 
with Vaughn, as opposed to Jeffrey, McPherson testified as follows: 
A: Well, being the basis - the basis of the 
understanding was that the furniture was 
just to be left long enough until we 
could find a place to live and it was 
done with - my whole dealings were 
with Vaughn. It was Vaughn who had 
purchased our home. It was Vaughn 
with which I had developed a comfort 
zone with, and that was basically it. I 
was going off assurances that his son 
was responsible and would take care of 
the property. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 11, Ins. 21-25; p. 12, Ins. 
1-4). 
4. In response to questioning by the Court about statements made 
by the parties concerning the alleged agreement, McPherson stated: 
The Witness: When we were talking we said 
now we're going to have to find a place for 
the furniture. At that time he [Vaughn] said 
that his son had no furniture, he was just 
going through a divorce and, you know, if we 
wanted to leave the furniture there that 
would be fine until we could find a per-
manent place for it, because - this thing was 
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very inconvenient thing for everyone involved. 
The Court: What did you say? 
The Witness: I said that was fine. The 
only thing we were concerned about was, you 
know, whether or not Jeff would take care of 
the - you know, be responsible for the furni-
ture, I mean take care of it. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 14, Ins. 7-20). 
5. As to possession and control of the bailed property, McPherson 
testified, on cross examination, as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) . . . Just so I'm straight 
on this, did Jeff Belnap move into the 
condominium unit right after you moved 
out? 
A: I believe so. 
Q: And the furniture was left in the con-
dominium for Jeff to use? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you have access to the furniture if 
you wanted it? 
A: Only by contacting someone ahead of 
time and letting them know that we 
would be making arrangements. 
Q: You would just call Jeff and say, hey I 
want to come by and get my television? 
A: Jeff or Vaughn. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 35, Ins. 12-25; p. 36, Ins. 
1-4) 
6. Vaughn's testimony concerning arrangements to leave the 
furniture in the apartment rented and occupied by Jeffrey is as follows: 
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Q: (By Mr. Reed) What did you say? Or, 
well, perhaps what did Mr. McPherson 
say would be more appropriate? 
A: Mr. McPherson told me that they had 
found a furnished apartment at Ameri-
can Towers, that they were in the 
process of making an offer or a deal on 
another home, that it would be very 
inconvenient for them to have to move 
all the furniture to a storage unit and 
then take it to the house, did I think it 
was possible or did Jeff agree to them 
leaving some of their belongings in the 
condominium. 
Q: What did you say to that request? 
A: I responded, Jeff would probably be 
delighted since he was going through a 
divorce and his wife had taken every-
thing he had and he would probably 
come with his toothbrush and personal 
belongings, but that I would call Jeff 
and explain the situation to him. 
Q: Did you call Jeff concerning this prop-
osal? 
A: Yes I did. 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) Did Jeff agree to keep 
the furniture? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did you have any other conversations 
with Mr. McPherson concerning storage 
of the furniture? 
A: No, not other than calling him and 
telling him Jeff had agreed to let him 
leave some of the items there. 
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(Trial Transcript, p. 62, Ins. 6-24; p. 63, Ins. 
5-11). 
7. No evidence was presented which even suggests that Jeffrey 
was an agent, or acted under the direction or control, of Vaughn. In 
fact, the only evidence presented concerning their relationship, other 
than familial, concerned the lease of the condominium unit by Jeffrey. 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) Did Jeff move into this 
condominium unit? 
A: (By Vaughn) Yes he did. 
Q: Did he pay rent for the unit? 
A: Yes he did. 
Q: Did he pay rent to you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was the amount of rent? 
A: I believe it was $750.00 a month. 
Q: Was that the same amount as was paid 
by Mr. McPherson? 
A: Yes. 
Q: I take it then Jeffrey was a tenant? 
A: He was at the time. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 5-17). 
8. As to actual physical possession and control of the bailed 
property, the only evidence offered is as follows: 
A: (By McPherson) . . . It was his son and 
- it would be his son moving and he 
[Jeffrey] was just getting divorced and he 
[Jeffrey] had no furniture. And so it 
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was - you know, he [Vaughn] said well 
he [Jeffrey] wouldn't mind if it was left 
there, he [Jeffrey] would take good care 
of it. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins. 12-16). 
A: (By McPherson) I was going off assur-
ances that his son [Jeffrey] was respon-
sible and would take care of the proper-
ty. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 12, Ins. 2-4). 
A: (By McPherson) The only thing we were 
concerned about was, you know, whether 
or not Jeff would take care of the - you 
know, be responsible for the furniture, I 
mean take care of it. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 14, Ins. 17-20). 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) Did you ever have any 
of Mr. McPherson's furniture in your 
possession? 
A: (By Vaughn) No I not. [sic] 
Q: Did you ever have the use of that 
furniture? 
A: No I did not. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 18-23). 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) Have you ever had 
possession of that furniture? 
A: (By Vaughn) No, I never have. 
Q: Ever use the furniture? 
A: No sir. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 13-17). 
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c. 
Application of Law to Evidence 
As set forth above, other than McPherson's statements that he 
relied on Vaughn because Vaughn had purchased his home and he had 
developed a "comfort zone" with Vaughn, there is no evidence that 
Vaughn agreed to hold the furniture for the benefit of McPherson or 
that Vaughn agreed to return the furniture. 
The only testimony with respect to the care, or return, of the 
furniture is that Vaughn informed McPherson that he believed that 
Jeffrey would care for the furniture. 
Similarly, there is no evidence which even suggests that Vaughn 
ever accepted delivery or had possession or control of the bailed 
personal property. The only evidence is that the bailed property was 
in the sole possession and control of Jeffrey. In fact, one of the two 
reasons that the furniture was left in Jeffrey's condominium unit was to 
allow him to have the use of the furniture. 
Although Vaughn facilitated the storage of the furniture by Jeffrey, 
and acted as an intermediary between McPherson and Jeffrey, he did 
not agree to accept delivery of the furniture and did not have 
possession of the bailed property. 
It was McPherson's clear understanding and intent that Jeffrey, 
rather than Vaughn, have the use, control and possession of the bailed 
property. 
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Even considering the evidence offered by McPherson in support 
of his claim, the trial court's finding that a bailment was created 
between McPherson and Vaughn and that McPherson delivered the 
personal property to Vaughn, and not Jeffrey, is so lacking in support 
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making it clearly 
erroneous. Because McPherson and Vaughn did not stand in the 
relationship of bailor and bailee, the decision of the trial court must be 
reversed and Judgment entered accordingly. 
II. 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT A BAILMENT WAS 
CREATED, THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
IT WAS A BAILMENT FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT 
A. 
Applicable Law 
The law generally recognizes three types of bailments: (1) a 
bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor; (2) a bailment for the sole 
benefit of the bailee; and (3) a bailment for the mutual benefit of 
both the bailee and bailor. Those bailments falling within the first 
category are known as gratuitous bailments. Those included within the 
latter two categories are often referred to as "bailments for hire". 
The duties of a gratuitous bailee differ, in degree, from those of 
a bailee for hire. A bailee for hire must exercise the degree of care 
which an ordinary prudent person under similar circumstances would 
exercise toward his own property. Romney vs. Covey Garage, 100 Utah 
167, 111 P.2d 545 (1941). However, as noted by the Court in Loomis 
vs. Imperial Motors, Inc. 88 Ida. 74, 396 P.2d 467 (1964), "[t]he liability 
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of a gratuitous bailee . . . is generally recognized as one arising only 
from gross negligence". (396 P.2d at 469-70). 
Although Vaughn strenuously contends that a bailment was not 
created, if such a relationship existed Vaughn was a gratuitous bailee 
and may be found liable only for acts of gross negligence. 
The trial court found as follows: 
The Court further believes that bailment was 
for the mutual benefit of both parties. The 
plaintiff accommodated defendant Vaughn 
Belnap in furthering the sale of the con-
dominium by moving out prior to the expira-
tion of the lease and by allowing Vaughn 
Belnap to use the furniture in furtherance of 
the sale of the condominium, to his son who 
had no furniture. (Findings of Fact, 11 8, R. 
203). 
B. 
Evidence Supporting 
Trial Court's Finding 
1. As discussed, in detail, above, one of the factors leading to 
the storage of the McPhersons' property in Jeffrey's condominium unit 
was that he had no furniture and the use of the McPhersons' furniture 
would be beneficial to him. (Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins, 10-25; p. 14, 
Ins. 7-20; p. 35, Ins. 16-18; p. 62, Ins. 6-24; p. 63, Ins 5-11). 
2. The primary purpose of the storage arrangement was to 
provide storage facilities to McPherson without cost and to eliminate the 
necessity of moving the furniture twice. (Trial Transcript, p. 10, Ins. 10-
25; p. 11, Ins. 21-25; p. 14, Ins. 7-20; p. 62, Ins. 6-15). 
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3. The only testimony concerning the alleged benefit to Vaughn 
is as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) Did you receive any 
benefit from the storage of that furniture 
in the condominium unit? 
A: (By Vaughn) No. Just headaches. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 64, Ins. 24-25; p. 65, In. 
i) 
Q: (By Mr. Kunkel) Would it have bene-
fitted you if your son purchased the 
condominium unit? 
A: (By Vaughn) Obviously. 
Q: So, the McPhersons moved out as an 
accommodation to you; is that correct? 
A: That is correct. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 38, Ins. 18-23). 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) In the winter of 1988 
did you have any legal obligation to 
support Jeff Belnap? 
A: (By Vaughn) No I didn't. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 9-11). 
4. During closing argument, McPhersons' counsel argued as 
follows: 
When Mr. McPherson was asked to leave the con-
dominium unit, he wanted to accommodate Mr. Belnap. In 
order to make that accommodation, Mr. McPherson had to 
leave his property there. So it was a benefit to Mr. 
McPherson and Mr. Belnap testified it was a benefit to him 
by having them leave so he could sell the unit. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 79, Ins. 2-8). 
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c. 
Application of Law to Evidence 
Although the evidence clearly establishes that McPherson accom-
modated Vaughn by vacating the condominium unit, there is no 
evidence which supports McPherson's argument that Vaughn used the 
furniture to further the sale of the condominium to Jeffrey. In fact, 
the only evidence on this point is that Jeffrey agreed to purchase the 
condominium prior to the time McPherson was asked to vacate the 
unit. (Trial Transcript, p. 38, Ins. 10-17; p. 61, Ins. 8-15). 
Jeffrey, not Vaughn, had the exclusive use and possession of the 
McPhersons' furniture. Jeffrey offered to purchase the condominium 
prior to the time the storage of furniture was ever discussed. Vaughn 
had no obligation to provide furniture for Jeffrey's use. Vaughn did 
not receive any benefit from the use of the furniture by Jeffrey or 
from the storage of that furniture in the condominium unit. 
Again, the trial court's finding that the "bailment was for the 
mutual benefit" of McPherson and Vaughn is so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence and is thus, clearly 
erroneous. For this reason, the trial court incorrectly applied a 
standard of ordinary care, rather than gross negligence and therefore, 
its decision must be reversed. 
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HI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING 
A PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE 
A. 
A Presumption of Negligence Arises Only if 
the Bailee has Exclusive Possession of 
the Bailed Property 
In the context of an action to recover for damage to bailed goods, 
a presumption of negligence is imposed on the bailee for hire, once the 
bailment and the damage to the bailed goods are established. Romney, 
supra at 546. 
However, this general rule is subject to an important exception 
which is applicable to the present case. 
The leading Utah case concerning the imposition of a presumption 
of negligence in the context of a bailment is Staheli vs. Farmer's 
Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982). There, this 
Court was confronted with a question of law identical to that present 
in this action, i.e. under what circumstances will a presumption of 
negligence arise. 
The underlying facts in Staheli are as follows: Plaintiff hired the 
defendant, Farmer's Co-op, to store barley pursuant to an oral contract 
of bailment. The Co-op leased one-half of a potato cellar, owned by 
another entity, for purposes of storing the barley. The portion of the 
cellar not used by the Co-op was used by the owner of the cellar for 
its own purposes. There was no wall or partition between the portion 
of the cellar leased by the Co-op and the part retained by the owner. 
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Persons other than the bailee had access to the stored barley. The 
bailor had knowledge of this arrangement. The barley was destroyed, 
in part, by a fire of unknown origin. 
The bailor brought suit against the Co-op to recover the value of 
the damaged barley and, as in the present case, at trial relied on the 
presumption of negligence. 
The trial court entered Judgment for the Co-op finding that a 
presumption of negligence did not arise and that " . . . no negligence 
on the part of the defendant was shown by the plaintiff, and without 
a showing of negligence on the part of the defendant, defendant is not 
responsible for the fire of unknown origin which caused the loss". 
Staheli, supra at 682. 
On appeal, plaintiff-appellant argued that it was entitled to a 
presumption that the Co-op was negligent as a matter of law and that 
the Co-op did not rebut that presumption. The Co-op argued that a 
presumption of negligence did not arise and that therefore the burden 
of proof did not shift because it did not have exclusive possession of 
the bailed goods. 
In deciding whether a presumption of negligence arises under 
circumstances where the bailee does not have exclusive possession or 
control of the bailed goods, this Court, in Staheli, first examined the 
general rule applicable to contracts of bailment. The Court explained 
that the rationale supporting the general rule is that the party who is 
in possession of another's property is in a better position to control any 
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conditions which might cause damage to the property or, at the least, 
he will be able to ascertain the cause of any damage. 
The Court recognized that the imposition of a presumption of 
negligence in the context of a bailment action is analogous to applica-
tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Of course, one of the 
prerequisites to application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that 
the defendant have exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the 
injury. Similarly, with respect to a bailment action, the bailee must 
have exclusive possession of the bailed property. After discussing these 
factors, this Court held as follows: 
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is 
that the bailee be in exclusive possession [of 
the bailed goods] and it is that proposition 
that gives logical force to the presumption. 
(655 P.2d at 680) (emphasis added). 
The Staheli Court also noted that on the facts before it, the Co-
op did not have exclusive control of the premises in which the barley 
was stored and concluded that " . . . the trial court properly held that 
a presumption of negligence did not arise because of the absence of the 
Coop's exclusive control of the premises". (Staheli, supra at 684) 
(emphasis added). 
The proposition that a presumption of negligence arises in bailment 
cases only upon a showing that the bailee had exclusive possession and 
control of the bailed goods, as set forth in Staheli, supra, is not unique 
to Utah. The courts of numerous other jurisdictions have recognized 
this requirement. 
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In Burt vs. Blackfoot Motor Supply Company, 67 Idaho 548, 186 
P.2d 498 (1947) and Nolan vs. Auto Transporters, 225 Kan. 176, 597 
P.2d 614 (1979) the courts stated that a presumption of negligence 
arises when the bailed goods are in the exclusive possession and control 
of the bailee, (186 P.2d at 501; 597 P.2d at 621). 
The rationale for this prerequisite to imposition of a presumption 
of negligence was succinctly expressed by the Court in Moe vs. American 
Ice and Cold Storage Company, 30 Wash.2d 51, 190 P.2d 755 (1948), 
where the Court stated: 
In other words, the common law, with its 
characteristic horse sense, makes a virtue out 
of necessity, growing out of the fact, that, 
where the bailee has the exclusive and un-
divided possession of the goods, he must also 
have the exclusive means of showing what 
became of them. Where the reason of the 
law ceases, the law ceases. For reasons 
which must be perfectly manifest to any 
thinking person, the rule referred to does not 
obtain or apply where the bailee does not 
have the exclusive and undivided possession of 
the property. (Quoting from Lemnos Broad-
silk Works, Inc. vs. Spiegelberg, 127 Misc. 855, 
217 N.Y.S. 595, 598) (190 P.2d at 761). 
Thus, in order for a presumption of negligence to arise in the 
context of the present action, the evidence must establish that Vaughn 
had exclusive possession of McPherson's furniture and that he had 
exclusive control of the storage facility, i.e. the condominium unit rented 
and occupied by Jeffrey. 
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The trial court found " . . . the presumption is that the defendant 
Vaughn Belnap, was negligent for failing to return the furniture . . . ". 
(Findings of Fact, 11 9; Conclusions of Law, 11 3; R. 204-205). 
B. 
Evidence Supporting Trial 
Court's Finding 
1. As discussed in detail at pages 11 through 16, above, the 
bailed property, at all times, was in the actual possession of Jeffrey, 
rather than Vaughn. (Trial Transcript, p. 35, Ins. 12-18; p. 63, Ins. 5-
6). 
2. Vaughn did not have exclusive control of the premises in 
which the furniture was stored. Those premises, i.e. the condominium 
unit, were controlled by Jeffrey as a tenant. (Trial Transcript, p. 35, 
Ins. 12-15; p. 64, Ins. 5-17). 
3. In addition to Jeffrey, on occasion his girlfriend was present 
in the condominium unit and had access to the bailed furniture. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 49, In. 25; p. 50, Ins. 1-2; p. 51, Ins. 16-19). 
C. 
Application of Law to Evidence 
In the present case, as in Staheli, the trial court found that 
McPherson and Vaughn entered into an oral contract of bailment. The 
bailed furniture was not stored in premises controlled by Vaughn. 
Rather, McPherson's property was stored, with McPherson's consent and 
knowledge, in the condominium unit rented and occupied by Jeffrey. 
Therefore, Jeffrey had possession of the bailed goods and control of the 
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premises in which those goods were stored. In addition, his guests had 
lawful access to the premises and to the bailed furniture. 
Simply stated, Vaughn had neither exclusive possession of the 
McPhersons' furniture, nor exclusive control of the premises in which 
the goods were stored. Under these circumstances, a presumption of 
negligence does not arise. 
The trial court's finding that "the presumption is that the 
defendant, Vaughn Belnap, was negligent" and its Conclusion of Law 
that " . . . the presumption is that Vaughn Belnap was negligent for 
failing to return the furniture" are so lacking in evidentiary support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence and are thus clearly 
erroneous. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 204-205). 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
VAUGHN WAS NEGLIGENT 
For purposes of this argument, Vaughn will assume that the trial 
court incorrectly imposed a presumption of negligence. In that case, the 
bailor must establish specific acts of negligence, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and establish that those specific acts proximately caused 
the alleged damages. (Staheli, supra at 684). 
A, 
Evidence Supporting 
Finding of Negligence 
1. The record is devoid of any evidence of any specific acts of 
negligence on the part of Vaughn. Although in closing argument, 
McPherson's counsel questioned whether " . . . the alleged theft was an 
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inside job or done by a third party", there is no evidence to support 
this speculation. (Trial Transcript, p. 80, Ins. 5-6). The only evidence 
which pertains to this point is a stipulation to the effect that the police 
investigation revealed no signs of forcible entry. (Trial Transcript, p. 
47, Ins. 1-3). 
2. A witness to the theft, Afton Todd, testified that on the day 
of the theft, she saw a pickup truck parked at the condominium unit, 
a man get out of the pickup, walk up to the unit and return to the 
pickup and then later the pickup truck returned and was loaded with 
furniture. (Trial Transcript, p. 55, Ins. 11-19). She also testified that 
neither Vaughn nor Jeffrey were occupants of the pickup truck. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 55, Ins. 24-25; p. 56, Ins. 1-4). 
3. Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled that the con-
dominium unit was secured on the day of the theft. He remembered 
locking the doors on that day because they were locked in response to 
an incident involving his ex-wife and his girlfriend. (Trial Transcript, 
p. 49, Ins. 18-25; p. 50, Ins. 1-13; p. 51, Ins. 3-25; p. 52, Ins. 1-10). 
B. 
Application of Law to Evidence 
Simply stated, no evidence of any negligent conduct on the part 
of Vaughn was introduced at trial. Therefore, absent a presumption of 
negligence, the trial court's finding that Vaughn was negligent and that 
his negligence proximately caused McPherson's injuries is so lacking in 
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support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence and is clearly 
erroneous. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT VAUGHN DID NOT REBUT THE 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE 
A. 
Applicable Law 
For the purposes of this argument, Vaughn will assume that the 
trial court correctly imposed a presumption of negligence and found that 
a bailment for mutual benefit was created. 
Under these circumstances, Vaughn was bound to care for 
McPherson's property with the same degree of care which an ordinary 
prudent person under similar circumstances would exercise toward his 
own property. (Romney, supra, at 546). 
Of course, once a presumption of negligence arises, the burden of 
going forward with the evidence to rebut that presumption rests on the 
bailee. (Staheli, supra, at 682). However, the burden of persuasion 
remains with the bailor. (Staheli, supra, at 683, fn. 1). 
The trial court found that " . . . Vaughn Belnap failed to prove 
that the loss of the furniture was not the result of his negligence". 
(Findings of Fact, 11 9; Conclusion of Law, 11 3; R. 204-205). 
B. 
Evidence Supporting 
Trial Court's Findings 
1. The only evidence presented concerning the exercise of care 
by Vaughn is as follows: 
29 
Q: (By Mr. Reed) You lived in that 
condominium unit prior to September, 
1988; is that correct? 
A: (By Vaughn) That's correct. 
Q: Did you have locks on the doors? 
A: Yes. Normal locks and deadbolt doors. 
Q: I assume there were windows in place? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Normal security? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was there any difference in the security 
of the unit at the time you lived in it 
than when Jeff lived there? 
A: No. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 21-25; p. 69, Ins. 
1-8). 
2. In addition, Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled locking 
and securing the condominium unit on the day of the theft. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 49, Ins. 13-25; p. 50, Ins. 1-13; p. 51, Ins. 20-25; p. 52, 
Ins. 1-10). 
C. 
Application of Law to Evidence 
Although only limited evidence was presented concerning Vaughn's 
care of McPherson's property, that evidence rebuts the presumption of 
negligence. 
Vaughn stated that he used the same degree of care, i.e. locks 
and other normal security, as he had employed in the care of his own 
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possessions. Jeffrey testified that he specifically recalled securing the 
condominium unit on the day of the theft. No evidence was presented 
which contradicts this testimony. 
Therefore, Vaughn successfully rebutted the presumption of 
negligence and the trial court's Finding, to the effect that "Vaughn 
Belnap, failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the result 
of his negligence", and its identical Conclusion of Law, are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. (Finding 
of Facts, 11 10 and Conclusion of Law, 11 3, R. 204-205). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award of Judgment to McPherson may, and should 
be, reversed for five different reasons. 
First, the court erred in finding that McPherson and Belnap stood 
in the relationship of bailor and bailee. The undisputed evidence 
establishes that McPherson did not enter into a bailment agreement with 
Vaughn, rather he entered into such an agreement with Jeffrey and 
Vaughn simply acted as an intermediary between the two. Similarly, 
the undisputed evidence establishes that Jeffrey, rather than Vaughn, 
accepted possession of the bailed goods. 
Second, the bailment, if any, to which Vaughn was a party was a 
gratuitous bailment, rather than a bailment for mutual benefit. Thus, 
Vaughn may only be held liable for acts of gross negligence, as 
opposed to a breach of the standard of ordinary care. Thus, the trial 
31 
court applied an incorrect standard of care and its decision should be 
reversed. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the trial court erred in 
imposing a presumption of negligence. In Staheli, supra, this court 
unequivocally held that a presumption of negligence arises in the context 
of a bailment only where the bailee has exclusive possession of the 
bailed property and exclusive control of the premises in which that 
property is stored. The record is devoid of any evidence which would 
even suggest that Vaughn had exclusive possession of McPherson's 
furniture or exclusive control of the condominium unit. For this reason, 
a presumption of negligence does not arise. 
Fourth, as McPherson failed to present any evidence of specific 
acts of negligence on Vaughn's part and relied solely on the presump-
tion, the trial court's decision must be reversed. 
Fifth, even should this Court find that a presumption of negligence 
was correctly imposed, Vaughn successfully rebutted that presumption. 
The only evidence concerning the care which he exercised for the bailed 
goods is that he used the same ordinary care which he exercised for 
his own property. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Appellant Vaughn Belnap 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County and instruct it to enter 
Judgment in favor of Defendant. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 18th day of June, 1991. 
CROWTHER & REED 
forney for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Dc;JU*> wttiitv 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and 
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VAUGHN BELNAP and 
JEFFREY BELNAP, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 890902949 PD 
This case was tried on August <2 1990 before the 
Court, without a jury. Plaintiff Joseph McPherson was present 
and represented by Scott S. Kunkel. Plaintiff Joan Elissa 
McPherson was not present. The defendants, Vaughn Belnap and 
Jeffrey Belnap were present and represented by Larry G. Reed. 
The Court heard testimony of the witnesses, admitted 
documentary evidence, heard oral argument and took the matter 
under advisement. The Court now being fully advised, enters 
its ruling. 
This case arose as a result of the defendant Vaughn Belnap 
leasing to the plaintiffs a condominium for a term of six 
months. During the term of the lease defendant, Vaughn Belnap, 
had an opportunity to sell the condominium. He requested that 
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the plaintiffs vacate the premises to accommodate the sale, 
which they did. However, the parties agreed that plaintiffs 
could leave their furniture in the premises until such time as 
they located a residence which could accommodate the 
furniture. Defendant Vaughn Belnap stated that the furniture 
would be a benefit to him because his son, who was in the midst 
of a divorce proceeding, could use the furniture. 
Defendant Vaughn Belnap could not return the furniture upon 
plaintiffs7 request, because he claimed it was stolen. 
The Court has concluded that under this fact situation a 
bailment has been created. The plaintiffs delivered to 
defendant Vaughn Belnap and not Jeffrey Belnap the furniture, 
with the express understanding that the furniture would be 
returned to plaintiffs. 
The bailment was for the mutual benefit of both parties. 
The plaintiffs accommodated defendant Vaughn Belnap in 
furthering the sale, plus allowing defendant Vaughn Belnap to 
use the furniture in furtherance of the sale of the condominium 
to his son who had no furniture. 
The Court further concludes that since this was a case 
where there was a mutual benefit, the presumption is that the 
defendant, Vaughn Belnap, was negligent for failing to return 
f^fi>-:; f\ 
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the furniture as agreed. Defendant Vaughn Belnap failed to 
prove that the loss of the furniture was not as a result of his 
negligence. 
As a result of defendant Vaughn Belnap being unable to 
return the furniture to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs suffered 
damages in the sum of $6,000.00, together with their costs and 
interest. 
The Court refers the parties to plaintiff's Trial Brief for 
additional reasons in support of its decision. 
Plaintiffs7 counsel shall prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with this 
Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this day of September, 1990. 
ipHjt A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this fl day of September, 1990: 
Scott S. Kunkel 
Robert W, Thompson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Larry G. Reed 
Attorney for Defendant 
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
iMczL<& 
By. 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 1991 
SALT LAKE COONTp 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and 
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VAUGHN BELNAP and 
JEFFREY BELNAP, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 890902949 PD 
Defendant Vaughn Belnap7s Motion for New Trial or Direct 
Entry of Judgment in Favor of Defendant, Motion to Tax Bill of 
Costs, Objection to form of Judgment and proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were heard on the 2 6th day of 
November, 1990. Plaintiffs were represented by Scott S. 
Kunkel. Defendant was represented by Larry G. Reed. 
The Court read the Memoranda filed by the respective 
parties, heard oral argument, and took the matter under 
advisement. The Court now rules. 
The first issue the Court will address is whether or not 
defendant Vaughn Belnap was negligent in failing to return the 
plaintiffs7 furniture since there was a bailment for the mutual 
benefit of the parties. 
^ i^ 
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Vaughn Belnap contends that the Court erred in concluding 
that the theft of the plaintiffs' furniture was caused by the 
negligence of Vaughn Belnap. 
Vaughn Belnap relies upon Staheli v. Farmers Co-op of 
Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982), as the basis for the 
Court erring in its decision. 
The Court has reviewed the Staheli case and believes the 
Staheli case is distinguishable from the present case. 
In this case the plaintiffs placed the furniture with 
Vaughn Belnap exclusively, and he in turn allowed his son to 
occupy the premises where the furniture was to be stored. 
Plaintiffs7 only access to the furniture was by permission 
of Vaughn Belnap. 
Vaughn Belnap was the only party who could authorize the 
moving of the furniture from the premises. 
Vaughn Belnap's son, Jeffrey Belnap, had no authority to do 
anything with the furniture other than as an agent or 
representative of his father. 
Vaughn Belnap entrusted Jeffrey Belnap to protect, secure 
and care for the furniture so that it could be returned to 
plaintiffs. 
(^ -
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The findings in the Staheli case were: 
All of the parties were aware of the easy 
access to all parts of the potato pit at all 
times crucial herein and most, if not all, along 
with third party owner of the potato pit and 
others were in and out of the premises as they 
desired or as their business dictated. Doors 
were left open and little or no concern was 
expressed by anyone concerning the other stored 
equipment or materials, which plaintiffs would 
now have this court find constituted an 
unreasonable risk of the loss that actually 
occurred or that the defendant had responsibility 
under the law to control transients at or near 
the premises, which plaintiffs further 
hypothesized may have caused the fire. 
The facts in this case and the Staheli case in this Court's 
opinion are not similar; therefore, the Court cannot come to 
the same conclusion as Vaughn Belnap has reached. 
The Staheli case held that "one who is in possession of 
another's property is in a better position to control the 
conditions that may cause the loss and to know, or at least to 
be able to ascertain the cause of any actual loss or damage." 
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is that the bailee 
be in exclusive possession, and it is that proposition that 
gives logical force to the presumption. 
In this case, as the Court pointed out to counsel at the 
time of oral argument, the bailee should not be able to escape 
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liability by turning over the care and security of the property 
to an employee, representative, or an agent• Vaughn Belnap 
elected to name his son as caretaker of the furniture and 
therefore must assume the responsibility for its safety. 
The Staheli case aptly states the rule: "Thus, the 
presumption allocates the burden of proof to a party most 
likely to have access to the evidence and, in the absence of 
evidence places liability on the party most likely to have been 
able to avert the loss." 
In this case Vaughn Belnap contends that the furniture was 
stolen from the condominium, but there was no evidence of 
forcible entry. The only evidence presented was self-serving 
statements of Jeffrey Belnap that the doors and windows were 
locked when he left the premises. 
The Court denies Vaughn Belnap's Motion for a New Trial or 
Entry of Judgment in his favor. 
Vaughn Belnap's Motion to Tax Costs is granted. 
Vaughn Belnap7s objection to the granting of prejudgment 
interest is denied. 
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Plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare an Order in accordance 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this JC day of January, 1991. 
?JLA 
[JOHN A. ROKICH 
RICT COURT JUDGE 
( 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD MCPHERSON and ] 
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
VAUGHAN BELNAP and JEFFREY ] 
BELNAP, ] 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
i Civil No. 890902949 PD 
) Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion for New Trial or 
Entry of Judgment in favor of Defendnat, Motion to Tax Costs and 
Objection to Form of Judgment came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable John A. Rokich of the above-entitled Court 
on November 26, 1990, Larry G. Reed appearing on behalf of 
Defendant Vaughan Belnap and Scott S. Kunkel appearing on behalf 
of Plaintiffs, Joseph Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa McPherson. 
Based upon the oral argument of counsel, study of the various 
motions and memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, and 
good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion for a New Trial 
or Entry of Judgment in his favor is denied. 
( . : ') 
JAN 2 4 
-t^b 
Deputy Cierk 
2. Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion to Tax Costs is 
granted. 
3. Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Objection to Granting 
of Pre-judgment interest is denied. /. ^ *— /J A v? '„ 
DATED this JL</_ day of January, 1991.^"^- £fw^*-o~, i *^~ 
BY THE COURT: 
3?h£j Honorable John A. Rokich 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Larry G. Reed 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the |*~>^ day of January, 1991, 
I deposited in the U.S. Mail, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Mr. Larry Reed 
Crowther & Reed 
455 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-fy\uAX^ \^T\CA/Y, ^xv^— 
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JAMES E. MORTON #3738 
SCOTT S. KUNKEL #5303 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorneys For Plaintiffs 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 484-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and ; 
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. \ 
VAUGHAN BELNAP and 
JEFFREY BELNAP, ] 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 890902949 PD 
) Judge John A. Rokich 
This case, came on regularly for a non-jury trial on August 
30, 1990, before The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court 
Judge. Plaintiffs Joseph Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa 
McPherson, were represented by Scott S. Kunkel of Hatch, Morton & 
Skeen and Defendant Vaughan Belnap was represented by Larry G. 
Reed of Crowther & Reed. The Court having heard testimony of 
witnesses, reviewed documentary evidence and argument of counsel 
and being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause 
appearing, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In or about September, 1988, Plaintiffs entered into a 
lease agreement with Defendant Vaughan Belnap wherein Vaughan 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 4 1991 
SALT LAKE OOU6K' 
By C ^ ^ 
Dttpuiy OJ6fK 
r ' 
Belnap agreed to lease a condominium he owned, located at 9 02 
West Newhampton Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, (hereinafter the 
"Condominium") to Plaintiffs for a period of six (6) months, 
2. In or about December of 1988, during the term of the 
lease, Vaughan Belnap had an opportunity to sell the Condominium. 
Vaughan Belnap asked Plaintiffs if they would be able to vacate 
the Condominium as soon as possible as he had found a buyer for 
the property. Plaintiffs agreed to vacate the Condominium to 
accommodate the sale, as long as Vaughan Belnap would let them 
leave their furniture in the Condominium until such time as they 
could locate a residence which would accommodate their furniture. 
Vaughan Belnap agreed to this condition and stated that the 
furniture would be of benefit to him because his son, Jeffrey 
Belnap, who was in the midst of a divorce proceeding, could use 
the furniture. 
3. Several weeks after moving out of the Condominium 
Plaintiff, Edward McPherson, contacted Vaughan Belnap and 
indicated to Vaughan Belnap that he needed to pick up his 
furniture and other personal items from the Condominium. Several 
days thereafter, Vaughan Belnap contacted Plaintiffs and 
indicated that he could not return the furniture as the furniture 
had been stolen. 
4. On or about December 15, 1988, Officer Marchant of the 
Murray Police Department, conducted an investigation of the 
alleged theft of Plaintiff's property. Officer Marchantfs 
investigation revealed that there was no evidence of any forcible 
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entry into the Condominium. 
5. At all relevant times during the events giving rise to 
this action, Vaughan Belnap was the owner of the Condominium, and 
Plaintiff's personal property that was left at the Condominium 
and in the care, custody and control of Vaughan Belnap. 
6. The items of personal property that Vaughan Belnap did 
not return to Plaintiffs are as follows: 
Purchase Date 
Item Price Purchased 
Mitsubishi 35" television $ 2,900.00 1985 
Cannondale Mud Bike $ 600.00 5/87 
Fat Chance Bike $ 1,485.00 5/87 
G.E. Microwave $ 3 00.00 
Couch, Loveseat, two chairs 
and one ottoman made of 
elephant hide $ 6,000.00 
Persian Rug $ 700.00 
7. The Court believes that under the fact situation of the 
case, a bailment was created. Plaintiffs delivered to Defendant 
Vaughan Belnap, and not Jeffrey Belnap, the furniture with the 
express understanding that the furniture would be returned to 
Plaintiffs. 
8. The Court further believes that bailment was for the 
mutual benefit of both parties. The Plaintiff accommodated 
Defendant Vaughen Belnap in furthering the sale of the 
Condominium by moving out prior to the expiration of the lease 
and by allowing Vaughan Belnap to use the furniture in 
furtherance of the sale of the Condominium, to his son who had no 
furniture. 
9. Finally, the Court concludes that since this was a case 
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where there was a bailment for mutual benefit, the presumption is 
that the Defendant, Vaughan Belnap, was negligent for failing to 
return the furniture, as agreed• Defendant, Vaughan Belnap, 
failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the result 
of his negligence• 
10. The Court believes that as a result of Defendant 
Vaughan Belnap being unable to return the furniture to 
Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs suffered damages in the sum of 
$6,000.00, together with their costs and interest. 
The Court, having made its Findings of Fact, now makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the fact situation of the case, a contract for 
bailment was created between Vaughan Belnap and Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs delivered to Defendant Vaughan Belnap, and not Jeffrey 
Belnap, the furniture, with the express understanding that the 
furniture would be returned to Plaintiff. 
2. The bailment that was created was for the mutual 
benefit of both Plaintiffs and Defendant, Vaughan Belnap. 
Plaintiffs accommodated Defendant Vaughan Belnap to further the 
sale, plus allowing Defendant Vaughan Belnap to use the furniture 
in furtherance of a sale of the Condominium to his son who had no 
furniture. 
3. Since the bailment was for the mutual benefit of the 
parties, the presumption is that Vaughan Belnap was negligent for 
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failing to return the furniture, as agreed. Defendant Vaughan 
Belnap failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the 
result of his negligence. 
4. As a result of the Defendant Vaughan Belnap breach of 
the bailment agreement by failing to return the furniture to 
Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs suffered damages in the amount of 
$6,000.00, together with their costs and interest. 
5. Interest on $6,000.00 in damages suffered by Plaintiffs 
shall accrue at the rate of 10% per annum prior to judment and 
12% after judgment and will begin to run from December 15, 1988 
until the time the judgment is paid in full. 
6. Additional reasons in support of the Court's decision 
is contained within the Plaintiff's trial brief. 
DATED this Jf ^ day of J~~«PJUCgn^ , 199J0. 
BY THE~~C0URT: 
I7 / 1 /-/ 
TMEjHONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
APPROVE AS TO FORM: 
LARRY REED 
Attorney for Defendant Vaughn Belnap 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On the 1/ day of October, 1990, I certify that I personally 
deposited into the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing Memoranduin of Costs and Disbursement addressed to: 
Larry Reed 
Crowther & Reed 
455 South Third East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
